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ABSTRACT: This article examines how well military education at the
Royal Military Academy of Sandhurst delivers lieutenants capable
of coping with the complexities of their operational environment
and the strategic implications of their decisions.

I

n the late 1990s, US Marine Corps General Charles C. Krulak
introduced the concept of the “strategic corporal,” which emphasized
the idea that even lower-level military leaders must be mindful of
the possible strategic implications of tactical and operational decisions.1
Krulak maintained militaries in post-Cold War operations had to be
prepared to engage in full-scale military interventions, peacekeeping
operations, and humanitarian aid missions. In complex and fluid
operating environments, waiting for orders from higher up the chain of
command could jeopardize time-critical decision-making and negatively
impact operational outcomes.
Krulak’s strategic corporal concept led to a shift among Western
militaries on the subject of strategic thinking. Increasingly, leadership
responsibilities were transferred down the chain of command, even to
the level of corporal. Fostering strategic thinking at the lower levels of
command presents threats and opportunities, but also calls for training
and education beyond traditional soldiering skills.2
Building on the notion of the strategic corporal, this article explores
the concept of the strategic lieutenant and asks to what extent military
education for young officers reflects new strategic and operational
realities. Specifically, it examines whether the British Royal Military
Academy of Sandhurst (RMAS) produces strategic-minded officers. The
RMAS Commissioning Course aims to train and educate officer cadets
to become strategic lieutenants imbued with a substantial amount of
knowledge and understanding of the complexities of an ever-changing
operational environment. The academy’s applied learning approach to
military education represents an integrated model of military training
and education and aims to enhance the strategic mindedness of young
British Army officers.
The aim of this article is threefold. First, it explores the extent to
which key changes in Britain’s strategic context since the end of the Cold

Dr. An Jacobs, now
a senior lecturer in
international relations
at Nottingham Trent
University, UK, was
previously a senior
lecturer at the Royal
Military Academy
Sandhurst in the UK
for over five years.
She holds a PhD on
the European Union’s
Common Security and
Defence Policy and
her research interests
include peacebuilding,
security sector reform,
the EU’s role in
1      Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” Marines international conflict
Magazine, January 1999.
management, African
2      Johan W. J. Lammers, “Commanding the Strategic Corporal” (working paper, Department of security questions, and
military education.
War Studies, King’s College London, December 2016).
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War are reflected in Britain’s military educational programs for young
officer cadets. As the article demonstrates, lessons learned from recent
operational deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan have been among the
key drivers for change, and have helped fuel the enhanced focus on
education in the professional development of young officers.
Second, this article addresses the specific educational model
Sandhurst applies to enhance strategic mindedness in British Army
officers and considers some challenges this model represents. It explains
how RMAS prepares strategic lieutenants through blended learning—
an integrated approach to training and education, where classroom
learning is put into practice and applied in exercises. The yearlong
Commissioning Course is augmented by extended academic learning
through the recently launched Army Higher Education Pathway
(AHEP), a mechanism to optimize officers’ professional development
during the first stages of their career.
Third, this article takes a first step toward measuring the effectiveness
of the Sandhurst model in educating strategic lieutenants, while also
considering the difficulties of evaluating educational outcomes.

Strategic Context

The British strategic context since the end of the Cold War has
witnessed both continuity and change. Immediately after the end of the
Cold War, Options for Change, the 1991 defense review, used the “peace
dividend” as an opportunity to cut defense spending from 4.1 percent
to 2.4 percent of the gross domestic product.3 Despite concerns the
proposed cuts lacked strategic vision and excessively limited operational
capability, especially following the Persian Gulf War, the focus on
downward budget pressure preoccupied the minds of government
leaders led by Margaret Thatcher and John Major.4
When the Labour Party took office in 1997, it committed to a new
defense review, which reflected the refusal to give up capabilities and
the desire to remain prepared for all eventualities in an uncertain and
unpredictable security environment.5 While the Franco-British St.
Malo declaration (1998) demonstrated more continuity than change
and an enduring preference for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), the Labour Party added the “force for good” element to Britain’s
traditional foreign policy ambitions, embodying a liberal interventionist
approach under the banner of intervening for the global good.6

3      International Security Information Service (ISIS), Options for Change: The UK Defence Review,
1990–1991, no. 21 (Brussels: ISIS, 1991).
4      Timothy Garden and David Ramsbotham, “About Face—The British Armed Forces, Which
Way to Turn?,” RUSI Journal 149, no. 2 (2004); and Mitch Mitchell, Decline, and Fall? The Influence
of Military Thinking on Britain’s Strategic Culture, Seaford House Papers (London: Royal College of
Defense Studies, 2013).
5      Ministry of Defense (MOD), Strategic Defence Review, Command Paper 3999 (London: MOD,
1998).
6      Mitchell, Decline and Fall?; and MOD, Strategic Defence Review.
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The global ambitions and responsibilities resulting from such an
approach soon became visible in deployments in Kosovo, Sierra Leone,
Afghanistan, and Iraq.7 Yet, the reputation of the British Army was
dented somewhat as a result of experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Substantial human and financial costs combined with limited operational
successes caused domestic public support and political appetite for
British deployments to wane, seemingly leading to the end of the “era
of interventionism.” 8
When the Cameron government took office in 2010, questionable
levels of success in Iraq and Afghanistan had already left their mark.
Cameron proposed a foreign policy based on national priorities, economic
interests, and rationality; however, this instrumentalist approach was
criticized as a mismatch between ambitions and resources.9 Indeed, while
public opinion and political appetite for deployments had decreased,
global ambitions and the global threat picture had not. Accordingly, the
2015 defense review emphasized threats facing Britain were larger, more
diverse, and more complex, thus requiring greater resourcing.10
Today, the British government is confronted with a list of daunting
challenges: balancing a shrinking defense budget with global foreign
policy ambitions, dealing with the challenges of “Brexit” negotiations
and related uncertainties, reassessing the meaning of the “Special
Relationship” with the United States under the Trump administration,
and ensuring preparedness for the Russian threat. Indeed, General
Nicholas P. Carter, then chief of the general staff, in January 2018 described
Russia as the biggest “state-based threat to [the UK] since the end of the
Cold War,” and the “most complex and capable security challenge.” 11 As
a result of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s increasing assertiveness,
the shift in British foreign policy away from deployment to armed
conflicts overseas never materialized.12
Despite foreign policy shifts and changes in the nature of global
conflict following the end of the Cold War, Britain’s role in the wider
strategic context in which it operates has seen more continuity than
7       Adrian L. Johnson, ed., Wars in Peace: British Military Operations since 1991 (London: Royal
United Services Institute for Defense Studies and Security Studies, 2014).
8      Frank Ledwidge, Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2011); and Johnson, Wars in Peace.
9      Office of the Prime Minister, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security
Strategy, Command Paper 7953 (London: Office of the Prime Minister, 2010); and House of
Commons, The Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy: Sixth
Report of Session 2010–12, H.C. Rep. No. 761 (2011).
10      Office of the Prime Minister, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review
2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom, Command Paper 9161 (London: Office of the Prime
Minister, 2015).
11      Nick Carter, “General Nick Carter: Dynamic Security Threats and the British Army,”
RUSI, streamed live on January 22, 2018, YouTube video, 1:10:15. https://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=C1O6NswL4iA
12      Matthew Ford, “Influence Without Power? Reframing British Concepts of Military
Intervention after 10 Years of Counterinsurgency,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 25, no. 3 (2014):
495–500; United Kingdom (UK) Department for International Development, UK MOD, and UK
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Building Stability Overseas Strategy (London: MOD, 2011); and
MOD, International Defence Engagement Strategy (London: MOD, 2013).
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change, and long-standing traditions remain prominent in British
strategic thinking. At the forefront of these traditions are Britain’s selfidentification as a country that endeavors to continue playing a powerful
role in the world with a high level of ambition to exert global influence
and with a security and defense policy predominantly aligned with and
through NATO and alongside the United States. Nevertheless, Britain
had to reflect on its role in a changing international context, and how
best to educate its young officers to operate effectively within it.

Educational Adaptation

At Sandhurst, program adjustments can materialize through
formal, informal, academic, and military channels. Lessons learned and
suggestions for change may come top down, bottom up, or sideways,
making it a flexible system that allows for an inclusive approach.13 The
implementation of changes, however, may take time to materialize and
to be reflected in the Sandhurst educational program.
Formal change processes can start as high as the defense secretary or
cascade down via the chief of the general staff, the Capabilities Branch,
and the Department for Personnel (DEPERS). Within DEPERS, the
Individual Development Branch sets the standards for individual officer
development throughout an Army career, and more specifically, the
standards on training requirements are set by the Training Requirements
Authority.14 The Sandhurst Group then translates these requirements
into a program of education and training through the Training
Delivery Authority.15
Sandhurst leadership is responsible for the specifics of course
programming and educational requirements, and the faculty has
substantial flexibility to design courses while ensuring compatibility
with military training.16 The course may also undergo adaptation as
a result of suggestions made by RMAS senior (military and civilian)
management, higher ranks of the Field Army, subject matter experts
in the relevant academic departments, and officers returning from
operational deployments. In practice, all staff members associated with
the educational program at Sandhurst monitor wider developments and
trends and suggest changes when deemed appropriate.
An historical assessment of the changes in military education at
Sandhurst since the 1970s demonstrates the recent culmination of a trend
toward an enhanced focus on academic study and reflects some lessons
learned from recent military operations. The Cold War period witnessed
two landmark changes in the approach to officer education. In the early
1980s, three academic departments were established: political and social
studies, war studies and international affairs, and the communications
department. The establishment of these departments reflected changes
13      Interview 4. 2017. Staff
14      Interview 1. 2017. Staff
15      Interview 2. 2017. Staff
16      Interview 5. 2018. Staff

Member RMAS, November 27, 2017.
Member RMAS, September 21, 2017.
Member RMAS, October 16, 2017.
Member MOD, January 30, 2018.
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in the academic world (where international politics was becoming a
separate discipline) and assumptions regarding necessary knowledge and
skills for young British Army officers.
A few years later, a second groundbreaking decision was made to
merge military training and education into a blended learning approach,
to maximize officer cadet time at the academy and to ensure the practical
application of learning outcomes.17 While there have been content-related
changes since, such as courses on counterinsurgency and stabilization,
the overall format and approach of the blended learning Commissioning
Course has remained largely unchanged.18
Discussions during the 1990s focused on the importance of military
education for enhancing young officers’ understanding of the new
strategic context and preparing them for a wide range of operational
deployments. But apart from some changes to course content, these
discussions did not develop into policies, and it was not until 2015
that the Sandhurst educational program underwent notable structural
changes. Until 2015, academic education for all officer cadets at RMAS
was taught at the undergraduate level only. But in January, Sandhurst
implemented its biggest educational change in decades and, for the
first time, offered separate but parallel undergraduate and postgraduate
programs.
It is important to note Sandhurst is not a university, but a military
academy where training and education exist alongside each other. The
decision to offer both programs in a training-intensive environment
demonstrates the enhanced importance given to officer education.
Soon after the postgraduate program was launched in 2018, AHEP was
introduced. The pathway offered degrees in leadership and strategic
studies throughout the first years of service to maximize the potential
of young British officers.
A wide array of factors influenced major changes in the Sandhurst
higher education program—particularly the decision to introduce the
postgraduate course and AHEP: the personal interests and beliefs of
those in leadership, recruitment and retention policies, and the need to
maximize learning and reflect diversity in backgrounds at RMAS. But
the lessons learned from operational experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan
also played an important role in recent decisions regarding the British
Army’s higher education policy.
As a result of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army has
more “battle hardened and experienced officers and soldiers than [it]
has had for several decades.” 19 Many returning officers have provided
17      Interview 3. 2017. Staff Member RMAS, November 27, 2017; and Richard Holman Thain,
Ambrose McDonough, and Alan Duncan Priestley, “The Development and Implementation of
a Teaching and Learning Strategy at a Modern Military Academy,” Journal of Further and Higher
Education 32, no. 4 (2008): 297–308.
18      Ian F. W. Beckett, “British Counter-Insurgency: A Historiographical Reflection,” Small Wars
& Insurgencies 23, no. 4–5 (2012): 781–98.
19      James K Wither, “Basra’s Not Belfast: The British Army, ‘Small Wars’ and Iraq,” Small Wars
& Insurgencies 20, no. 3–4 (2009): 611–35.
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valuable feedback to RMAS on how to improve the professionalism
of the British Army in contemporary conflicts. Although much of the
blame for recent operational failures went to the political level, where
the Army’s general weaknesses and gaps in the training and education of
young officers received fierce criticism, there was a growing belief that
standards of training and education needed adjusted to deliver officers
who were fit for purpose.20
Indeed, Iraq and Afghanistan have “severely tested assumptions
of [the UK’s] competence in counter-insurgency and the ability of its
institutions to adapt to unconventional conflicts.” 21 Such criticisms
posed the question of a need for institutional reform not only in the
wider Army as a whole but also in officer education more specifically.22
The drivers behind the resulting changes included military and civilian
actors, working through both formal and informal structures, with a
strong impetus from lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The Sandhurst model of developing young officers through a
one-year intensive and integrated course is substantially different from
most other NATO military academies, which often offer four years of
academic study alongside military training. Recent changes, however,
demonstrate a trend toward increased importance given to academic
study. While also reflecting the needs of recruitment and retention,
this trend demonstrates an increased desire on the part of the British
Army to develop young officers who are not merely good tactical-level
decisionmakers but also cognizant of the potential strategic implications
of their decisions—in other words, strategic lieutenants.

Blended Learning

The Sandhurst interpretation of strategic mindedness is executed
through an approach of “blended learning,” in which military training
and education are integrated to allow cross-fertilization in the learning
process and maximize student potential. It reflects the RMAS ethos
of a student-focused and active learning environment.23 While not an
academic course, the Sandhurst Commissioning Course is a yearlong
intensive and highly integrated program where academic subjects
delivered by three academic departments (Defence and International
Affairs, Communications and Applied Behavioral Science, and War
Studies) are taught alongside military training, and where classroom
learning is applied in military exercises. This intensive civil-military
cooperation helps develop strategic-minded lieutenants.

20      Graeme Lamb, “Operational Success—Strategic Failure,” British Army Review 137 (Summer
2005): 48–51; Wither, “Basra’s Not Belfast”; and E. J. R. Chamberlain, “Asymmetry: What Is It and
What Does It Mean for the British Armed Forces?,” Defence Studies 3, no. 1 (2003): 17–43.
21      Johnson, Wars in Peace.
22      Ledwidge, Losing Small Wars.
23      An Jacobs and Norma Rossi, “Best Practices in Academic Contributions to UK Defence
Engagement: Teaching International Conflict Management in Chile,” Wish Stream Journal (2018):
76–77.
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The Commissioning Course is taught across the junior, intermediate,
and senior terms with the blended learning approach omnipresent
throughout the year. Under this construct, students may, for example,
have military tactics, physical training, and academic study all in one
morning. While certain academic subjects are taught in classroom
settings such as seminar groups, interactive lectures, or centralized
lectures, the blended learning approach comes to life in exercises.
The first comprehensive exercise where blended learning is applied
is Exercise Normandy Scholar, which takes place at the end of the junior
term and is delivered jointly with academic and military personnel from
the War Studies department. It covers two main themes: military decisionmaking through the combat estimate and developing an understanding
of the realities of war. While an initial lecture provides the strategic,
operational, and tactical overview, cadets also receive a realistic problem
for a combat estimate prior to deploying to the exercise, on which they
receive feedback afterward through a staff-led discussion. By the end of
the exercise, students are expected to have a better understanding of the
history of the battle, its military-tactical details, and the usefulness of a
combat estimate.
Second, Exercise Agile Influence is a multiagency negotiation
exercise led by the Communications and Applied Behavioral Science
department that enhances cadets’ understanding of the human terrain
and the relationships between different actors in a conflict-affected
village reflecting tribal dynamics, state actors, nongovernmental
organizations, government departments, and indigenous peoples. This
daylong exercise exposes the cadets to role-playing and is predominantly
influence focused.
Third, and building upon Agile Influence, the weeklong Exercise
Templar’s Triumph is a stabilization exercise in a complex human terrain
comprised of regular forces and various insurgent groups. Cadets must
create an environment of sufficient stability to allow government forces
to flourish. Cadets are asked to take the roles of government forces,
opposing forces, and the civilian population by expanding on skills
and knowledge acquired through previous exercises. They are expected
to learn to think like the enemy and to conduct estimates on how to
unhinge rival forces. The multiagency context they are provided has
additional assets in this exercise, such as search teams and dogs, media
teams, political advisers, and bomb disposal teams. This exercise is also
the key testing ground for the concept of the law of armed conflict.
Finally, Exercise Dynamic Victory exposes the officer cadets to a
truly complex and mixed operational environment of states, insurgents,
proxy forces, and state-controlled deniable forces (“little green men”).
Exercises are also being converted to the Decisive Action Training
Environment to include elements of contemporary operations such
as cyberwarfare and the use of unmanned aerial vehicles and to learn
lessons from partners in conflict. This allows students to apply their
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knowledge and skills to solve tactical problems in a range of scenarios
derived from actual threats.
The exercises at Sandhurst, in general, reflect the mission command
culture of the British Army, where initiative, responsibility, and trust are
central ingredients. The elements of initiative and trust are especially
relevant as they underscore the need for a thorough understanding of
operational complexities and the wider strategic picture at all levels
of decision-making.24 The Information Age generates circumstances
where this interpretation of mission command is the fundamental basis
of success.25
In sum, the Sandhurst approach puts thinking at the forefront, and
applied knowledge and intellectual skills are valued higher than academic
knowledge in the narrow sense of the word. Blended learning and exercises
enhance the strategic mindedness of officer cadets by exposing them
to complex environments. In addition, the blended learning approach
provides flexibility, allowing RMAS to make adjustments when necessary,
so students are exposed to relevant operational challenges. As a result,
the design of the exercises themselves reflects the growing complexity of
the British strategic context and its operational requirements with regard
to context, skills required, and types of deployments.26

The British Army Higher Education Pathway

While blended learning was adopted as the educational practice
at Sandhurst before the end of the Cold War, British officer education
has also witnessed substantial adaptations more recently. At the start
of 2015, RMAS introduced postgraduate education alongside its
already existing undergraduate strand, to allow students with a relevant
educational background to embark on a master’s degree in the early
stages of their officer career. This marked the beginning of a broader
acknowledgment of the importance of military education in the wider
Sandhurst curriculum, and in 2018, pathway was set in motion.
This new mechanism awards young officers the opportunity to
complete BSc and MSc degrees in leadership and strategic studies
through the RMAS partnership with the University of Reading during
the first years of their service. It seeks to “maximise . . . talent and
develop individuals with higher conceptual and analytical skills to
support future roles.” 27
As discussed above, launching AHEP was driven to some extent
by the British Army’s aspiration to regain its domestic and international
standing after failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, which resulted in a
renewed focus on the education of young officers from the very early
24      Sergio Catignani, “‘Getting COIN’ at the Tactical Level in Afghanistan: Reassessing CounterInsurgency Adaptation in the British Army,” Journal of Strategic Studies 35, no. 4 (2012): 513–39.
25      Jim Storr, “A Command Philosophy for the Information Age: The Continuing Relevance of
Mission Command,” Defence Studies 3, no. 3 (2003): 119–29.
26      Interview 5. 2018. Staff Member MOD, January 30, 2018.
27      Maj Gen Paul Nanson, quoted in British Army, Army Higher Education Pathway: Lead and
Learn—Degrees While You Serve (London, British Army, 2018), 2.
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stages of their educational path in the Army.28 While some suggested
the most urgent educational requirements existed on the midranking
officer level, the decision was made to adjust the educational structure
early in officers’ careers, starting at Sandhurst. This approach sought to
tackle what had been criticized as a “deeply entrenched anti-intellectual
tradition. . . . that discourages critical thinking.” 29
The AHEP mechanism implemented through the Individual
Development Branch and related courses will continue during the early
stages of an officer’s career to link training, education, and professional
roles. It also seeks to enhance military education within the British
Army and to develop higher-level conceptual and analytical skills to
support future responsibilities. Its purpose is to maximize talent and to
professionalize thinking in the Army, create agile minds, and enhance
diversity in the officer corps. It reinforces relevant theories as well as
historical and current military events through reflective and applied
learning. The pathway adopts an integrated approach, where credits can
be earned through education, training, regimental duty, and operations, to
support the young officer in “being professionally capable, intellectually
eager and able to adapt and learn to succeed in a complex and rapidly
evolving world.” 30
This “lead and learn” pathway, as AHEP is also referred to, aims to
strengthen the British Army’s lifelong career leadership and professional
development opportunities. The rationale behind it is to evolve and adapt
“to changing environments. . . . by developing conceptual and intellectual
capacity. . . . and enable[ing] Officers to approach novel situations and
develop creative and effective solutions to volatile, uncertain, complex
and ambiguous problems.” 31
In practice, the AHEP means officer cadets at Sandhurst can,
depending on their qualifications, step into a BA or MA in leadership
and strategic studies in partnership with the University of Reading and
its Henley Business School. Thus, “for the first time, the majority of
early career courses from [the Sandhurst Commissioning Course] to
the [Intermediate Command and Staff College] will be academically
recognized.” 32 The courses delivered by the academic departments at
Sandhurst are validated as one-third of the total degree (see figure 1).
Although the degrees will start at Sandhurst, they will continue
during the early stages of an officer’s career by adopting a unique
approach that links training, education, and leadership experience. As
such, AHEP underscores once more the philosophy behind the flexible
and applied blended learning approach at Sandhurst.
28      Interview A. 2015. Staff Member MOD, June 25, 2015.
29      Daniel Marston, “Force Structure for High- and Low-Intensity Warfare: The AngloAmerican Experience and Lessons for the Future” (discussion paper, National Intelligence Council
2020 Project, Washington, DC, 2004); and quote in Tom Mockaitis, “Losing Small Wars: British
Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 24, no. 4 (2013): 760–62.
30      Interview 6. 2018. Senior Officer, Sandhurst Group, May 7, 2018.
31      British Army, Army Higher Education Pathway.
32      British Army, Army Higher Education Pathway.
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Figure 1. BSc/MSc in “Leadership and Strategic Studies”

Challenges of the Sandhurst Model

While the British Army and wider Ministry of Defense have
expressed great confidence in the value and effectiveness of the blended
learning approach and the wider educational pathway, they do present
challenges specific to the Sandhurst model.
Firstly, academic departments at RMAS only have a limited amount
of time with the officer cadets during their Commissioning Course.
While other military academies may follow more traditional academic
structures and approaches, officer cadets spend no more than a year at
Sandhurst, during which they are exposed to an extremely demanding
program of both military training and education.
Finding a perfect balance between a demanding and stimulating
course, on the one hand, and leaving time and space for reflection to
allow students to internalize learning processes, on the other, is therefore,
a continuously challenging task. It is an ongoing quest to find ways to
maximize students’ learning potentials and to find the most effective
and suitable balance between training and education. This challenge has
been mitigated to some extent by the launch of the AHEP mechanism,
which allows for a continued blended approach beyond RMAS.
Secondly, the approach requires close civil-military cooperation
between academic departments and military instructors. Especially
when change processes are taking place, all relevant stakeholders need
to be mindful of the direction of change, to adjust academic courses,
military training, and joint exercises. In addition, with a tight time
schedule and a lot to fit in during the duration of the Sandhurst course,
effective programming reflective of the desired learning outcomes is
also a challenging task. This need for close cooperation between civilian
and military personnel increases mutual understanding and respect to
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further support linking strategic and operational knowledge key for
developing strategic lieutenants.
Thirdly, while students at other military academies commence
officer training and education after secondary education, and with little
or no previous academic experience, students arriving at Sandhurst
come from a variety of educational and professional backgrounds. The
majority of cadets have already completed an undergraduate degree in
areas as diverse as humanities, natural sciences, engineering, and sport
science prior to arriving at the academy. Most of these students will
enroll in the postgraduate strand. The remaining students will enroll
in the undergraduate course, as they have come up through the ranks,
completed A-levels, or come with work experience, and therefore have
been exposed to less academic study.33 This factor demonstrates the
diversity of the background represented in the student cohorts.
While there is value in training and educating an already diverse
cohort of students, doing so also poses challenges for the academic
curriculum. The student diversity encourages the academic staff to adopt
innovative teaching styles such as problem-based learning, classroom
debates, group work, and learning through exercises to ensure that
collective learning takes place and the student diversity works as a tool
to maximize individual learning outcomes.

Measuring Effectiveness

Measuring the effectiveness of the blended learning approach and
the AHEP is challenging for various reasons. While RMAS continuously
conducts evaluations regarding the Commissioning Course as a whole,
student evaluation forms do not inquire about the effectiveness of the
program and the learning outcomes at later stages of officers’ careers.
Similarly, the academic evaluations are predominantly concerned with
content-related feedback, and to what extent the students feel that they
enhanced their academic skills, knowledge, and understanding as a
result of the Sandhurst military education program.
The blended learning approach has stood the test of time since
the 1980s, demonstrating the long-standing support for this approach
across military ranks. A number of senior military officers—including
the current Commandant of the Sandhurst Group Major General
Paul Nanson—have emphasized the value of incorporating academic
learning into military training and expressed appreciation for the
military education they were exposed to while at Sandhurst during later
stages of their career.
As the introduction of a postgraduate strand and the implementation
of the AHEP are such recent developments, it is too early to measure
their impact and to assess the effectiveness of the current curriculum
throughout officers’ career. But monitoring young officers’ first year of
33      An Jacobs, “Teaching IR at Sandhurst: Blended Learning through an Integrated Approach,”
in “International Relations in Professional Military Education,” special issue, Infinity Journal (Winter
2016): 50–55.
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service over the next decade will shed some light on this. Captains and
majors can reflect on the value of their learning at Sandhurst and beyond,
and how AHEP has helped them develop as strategic-minded officers.
For the purpose of this article, a sample group of 75 students was
asked to complete a questionnaire anonymously with specific reference
to strategic thinking skills. The students were asked to assign a value of
1 (not at all) to 5 (very much) to the following statements:
1. The Sandhurst approach of delivering military education and training
alongside each other and bringing them together in exercises has given
me the ability to put classroom learning into practice.
2. The Sandhurst approach has given me the ability to see the bigger
strategic picture in operational situations.
3. I feel confident about my ability to understand the bigger strategic
picture in operational situations.
4. The Sandhurst program has helped me to better understand the
complexities of operational environments.
5. I consider myself a strategic-minded young officer/officer cadet.
While the results are preliminary and incomplete, they nevertheless
provide interesting initial insights into students’ perspectives of how the
Sandhurst program contributes to strategic thinking. In addition, a few
interesting observations can be made about the initial data.
Firstly, as a general point, the answers demonstrate the majority of
the students have answered the above questions with a four (considerably)
or five (very much). Not a single student has responded “not at all” to
any of the questions, and only an average of 4.2 percent of the students
responded with “to some extent” across the five questions. We can,
therefore, assume the sample group overall sees a positive correlation
between the Sandhurst course and developing into strategic-minded
officers.
Secondly, while for three out of five questions, 20 percent or less
of the student sample selected “moderate,” 30 percent percent or more
selected “moderate” for question one (has the Sandhurst approach
given the student the ability to put classroom learning into practice)
and question five (do the students consider themselves strategicminded officers) scored. This feedback may suggest there is room for
improvement in these areas.
Furthermore, some of the students who “moderately” considered
themselves a strategic-minded officer, also said the Sandhurst program
“very much” helped them to understand better the complexities of
operational environments. Such responses demonstrate the students
do not necessarily equate understanding complex realities with “being”
a strategic lieutenant. Ensuring the knowledge and understanding
acquired through military education is internalized and adopted in a
way that influences a young officers’ decision-making may be something
to consider in this respect.
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Acknowledging the limits of this questionnaire and the related
findings, we can draw no definitive conclusions from these data. But
these initial student responses can provide a starting point to plan and
execute future targeted questionnaires on a larger scale. Sandhurst can
then gather more data and conduct accurate statistical analysis to be
better informed about the impact and effectiveness of the Sandhurst
Commissioning Course in developing strategic lieutenants.

Conclusion

This article has shown there are elements of continuity and change
in Britain’s strategic context, as well as its approach to military education
at Sandhurst. While the link between changes on the strategic level and
changes in military education is hard to detect, at least certain recent
structural changes to the curriculum have been influenced by strategic
experiences. The increased importance given to military education,
reflected in the introduction of a postgraduate course in 2015 and the
launch of the AHEP in 2018, was influenced by—among other factors—
lessons learned from operational experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The Sandhurst educational philosophy is firmly based on interactive
and applied learning, as reflected in the blended learning approach that
combines training and education through flexible and active pedagogy.
The blended learning approach has been a consistent tool to enhance
officer learning since the 1980s and has been applauded for its worth
by all military ranks. Only time will tell whether the recent changes in
military education will be considered equally effective.
The initial questionnaire provides some useful directions for future
evaluations and further research. Firstly, more than 30 percent of the
students labeled the Sandhurst approach only moderately conducive to
putting classroom learning into practice and considering themselves
only moderately as strategic-minded officers. Making further inquiries
about the reasons behind these scores through more extensive
questionnaires will help RMAS understand what measures can be put
into place to improve this score. This is linked to the wider theme of this
volume—how are strategic lieutenants developed successfully, which is
an underexplored but valuable research topic.
Secondly, student responses suggest there is a discrepancy between
developing strategic thinking, on the one hand, and actually being a
strategic-minded officer, on the other. Future evaluations would benefit
from exploring this issue further. In addition, further research on how
to internalize learning in fast-paced, intensive, and demanding military
environments; to adopt skills and knowledge in everyday life; and employ
learning outcomes in professional tasks will offer useful insights for the
study of military education. Enhancing the understanding of the impact
of blended learning can feed into the design of the Sandhurst curriculum
to improve further the quality of the strategic-minded British officer.
Finally, the blended learning approach overall has been applauded
and appreciated by officers at later stages in their career. But at the same
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time, more than 30 percent of students at Sandhurst label its effectiveness
for applied strategic mindedness as “moderate.” This might imply a delay
in the learning process between Sandhurst and the subsequent courses
at the Defense Academy in Shrivenham. As the AHEP offers a more
continuous process of military education, it will be a valuable exercise
to measure not only its impact over the next two decades but also the
effectiveness of RMAS and the overall British approach to military
education.
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